45 Buffalo L. Rev. 1001 (1997)
Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail and the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991
David E. Sorkin*
Introduction
Congress enacted the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of
19911 (TCPA)
in response to abuses by the telemarketing
industry.2 The TCPA
regulates the use of automatic telephone dialing
systems3 and
prerecorded calls,4
and requires telemarketers to maintain "do-not-call"
lists.5 The TCPA
also prohibits the sending of unsolicited advertisements to telephone
facsimile machines6--so-called "junk
faxes."7
The "junk faxes" Congress had in mind were advertising messages sent to
conventional fax machines by means of stan-
[1002]
dard facsimile protocols.8 But the TCPA's definition of "telephone facsimile
machine" is extremely broad:
The term "telephone facsimile machine" means equipment which has
the capacity (A) to transcribe text or images, or both, from paper
into an electronic signal and to transmit that signal over a
regular telephone line, or (B) to transcribe text or images (or
both) from an electronic signal received over a regular telephone
line onto paper.9
A personal computer equipped with a standard modem and a printer (or a
scanner) would qualify as a telephone facsimile machine under this
definition.10 Many
computer users have argued that "junk e-mail" is therefore prohibited by the
TCPA,11 and some have
even brought lawsuits against e-mail marketers based upon the
TCPA.12
The Ninth Circuit has upheld the constitutionality of the TCPA's
restrictions on prerecorded calls and unsolicited fax
advertisements,13
though some commentators have questioned the validity of the distinction
between commercial and noncommercial messages.14 A federal district court in Pennsylvania has
[1003]
adopted a narrow construction of the term "unsolicited advertisement," holding
that it does not include solicitations for
employment.15 To
date, however, no court has determined whether the ban on unsolicited fax
advertisements also applies to advertisements transmitted by electronic
mail.16
Section I of this Article describes facsimile
machines and electronic mail. Section II discusses
construction of the TCPA, including an examination of its language and
legislative history. Policy arguments for and against application of the TCPA
to electronic mail are considered in Section III.
Section IV explores alternative methods of addressing
the problems raised by unsolicited commercial e-mail.
I. Facsimile Machines and Electronic Mail
A. Facsimile Machines
A fax machine can transmit a copy of a printed document over an ordinary
telephone line in a matter of minutes or seconds. Facsimile technology is
over 150 years old, but fax machines became ubiquitous only in the late
1980s.17 There are
[1004]
now several million fax machines in use in the United
States,18 and
billions of faxes are sent each year.19
A conventional fax machine scans a printed document, dials a telephone
number that connects it to another fax machine, and transmits the digitally
encoded document image to the other machine, which prints out a copy of the
document. The encoding is done using one of several industry-standard
protocols, most commonly the Group III standard, which requires about thirty
seconds to one minute to transmit each page.20
As fax machines became more common in offices in the late 1980s,
creative marketers began sending unsolicited advertisements by
fax.21 Owners of fax
machines complained about the cost and inconvenience of these "junk faxes,"
and in response many states and eventually Congress imposed restrictions on
unsolicited faxes.22
The TCPA now requires marketers to receive
[1005]
permission from fax machine owners before sending advertising material by
fax.23
B. Electronic Mail
An electronic mail ("e-mail") message is a computer file transferred
from one computer to another.24 A computer can send and receive e-mail messages
and other data over an ordinary telephone line using a
modem.25 Electronic
mail can also be exchanged among computers on a local area network or between
separate networks that are interconnected.26 The Internet, a very large network of computer
networks, provides such interconnectivity to millions of computers around the
world. An electronic mail message can be transmitted between two computers on
the Internet within minutes or seconds, though in rare instances a message may
take several hours or even longer to arrive.27
[1006]
Telephones (and fax machines) operate using a dedicated circuit for the
duration of each communication, as do some electronic mail networks. On the
Internet, however, each e-mail message or other communication is divided into
packets of data that are transmitted dynamically along whatever route is
deemed most expedient at the time.28
There are many different protocols for electronic mail messages.
Bulletin board systems and local area networks frequently use their own
proprietary protocols for internal messages. Electronic mail messages are
transmitted over the Internet using the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
(SMTP).29 Commercial
applications often use more complex protocols.30
Various encoding schemes can be used to convert graphic images, sounds,
and even video into data that can be transmitted as e-mail. An e-mail message
ordinarily originates in digital form, as a text document created in a word
processor or e-mail program. However, it is possible to scan a printed
document and encode it digitally (either as a graphic image or as plain text,
generated using optical character recognition software), in order to transmit
it as an e-mail message.
With the recent rapid expansion of the Internet, e-mail use has
increased dramatically. Tens or hundreds of billions of e-
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mail messages are transmitted over the Internet each
year.31 Much of the
Internet's growth has occurred in the commercial sector, in part because the
Internet provides businesses with a low-cost, highly efficient means of
disseminating information. Businesses ranging from multinational corporations
to individual entrepreneurs have established "home pages" on the World Wide
Web to advertise and support their wares. Companies use electronic discussion
forums32 to
communicate with groups of people, and electronic mail to communicate with
individual customers, suppliers, and stockholders.
Much of the advertising matter now found on the Internet, particularly
that transmitted by electronic mail, is viewed by many Internet users as
irrelevant and unwanted. In part this is a result of the history of the
Internet as a noncommercial network, and the lingering anti-commercial
culture of the Internet.33 Largely, however, the reaction is based upon the
intrusiveness, inconvenience, and expense of receiving unsolicited e-mail
advertisements. The economics of the Internet are also of little help: it
can be cheaper to send an advertising message everywhere than to target it to
a narrow group of prospects,34 and it may be more effective to force an
advertising message
[1008]
into recipients' electronic mailboxes than to hope that they will search out
the advertiser's home page on the Web.35 Internet users often find themselves drowning in
"junk e-mail" as a consequence,36 and have responded to these unwanted and
unsolicited messages in a variety of ways, including threatening to file suit
under the TCPA.37
C. Comparison of Fax and E-Mail
The primary objections to unsolicited fax advertising are the cost and
inconvenience imposed upon the recipient.38 Unsolicited e-mail imposes similar burdens upon
the recipient, a point often made by proponents of a ban on such messages.
The magnitude of the burden imposed by each unsolicited e-mail message is much
less than that imposed by an unsolicited fax. However, it is easier and less
expensive to send large numbers of unsolicited advertisements by e-mail than
by fax. Unsolicited e-mail therefore may ultimately place a much greater
burden upon recipients than unsolicited fax transmissions.
The sender of a fax ordinarily pays only for the telephone call to the
recipient's fax machine. An advertiser can therefore send fax advertisements
for a few cents each. The recipient, on the other hand, must supply the paper
and ink or toner needed to produce the printed copy of the document. Older
and less expensive fax machines require special thermally activated paper or
costly thermal transfer ribbons; more expensive machines use laser or inkjet
technology to print on plain paper.39 A recent sur-
[1009]
vey estimates the cost of printing each page on modern consumer-oriented
fax machines at about 4 to 12 cents.40 The recipient also bears the cost of wear and tear
on the receiving fax machine, as well as administrative costs incurred in
logging and routing incoming faxes and replenishing paper and ink
supplies.41
Unlike faxes, electronic mail messages normally are not printed out
automatically; therefore, the cost of paper and ink usually is not included in
the cost of receiving e-mail. The cost of receiving e-mail via the Internet
depends primarily upon the recipient's means of accessing the Internet. Most
Internet users with dial-up connections pay either an hourly rate or a flat
monthly rate, in addition to any applicable telephone
charges.42
Employers, educational institutions, and libraries generally pay their
Internet providers based upon bandwidth (capacity), and e-mail traffic
probably has little effect on bandwidth needs in most
instances.43 Another
cost component is disk space for storage of incoming e-mail messages on the
recipient or provider's
[1010]
computer system.44
Internet users do bear costs for receiving e-mail messages, although
increasingly these costs are borne by the user's online service or Internet
provider, and subsequently may be passed along to the individual user in the
form of increased subscription or access charges. Users can reduce some but
not all of these costs by filtering out unwanted messages or deleting them on
sight.45 Ultimately,
the costs involved in transmitting an e-mail message are divided roughly in
half between the sender and the recipient,46 although one paying long-distance telephone charges
or an hourly access rate likely will bear relatively more of the cost, and a
bulk e-mailer likely will bear less.47
[1011]
Another objection to unsolicited fax advertising is that it ties up the
recipient's fax machine, making it impossible to send or receive other
messages while the advertisement is being
received.48 While
each fax may take less than one minute, a machine that receives a large number
of fax advertisements each day may be tied up much of the time. Unsolicited
e-mail generally does not cause a similar problem, since multiple messages may
be received simultaneously. However, the recipient's telephone line may be
tied up for the time it takes to download each message unless he or she can
delete unread messages without downloading them
first.49
Unsolicited faxes do pose a small additional inconvenience to
recipients, in that the recipient must decide which faxes merit further
attention and which can be discarded unread. This inconvenience is similar to
that involved in direct mail advertising: a brief glance at each item is
usually sufficient. Phone calls from telemarketers are generally considered
more intrusive than faxes or direct mail, because they are interactive and
because they must be dealt with immediately.50
Bulk e-mail also can be inconvenient for recipients, especially if the
sender uses a vague or misleading subject line to conceal the nature of the
message, forcing the recipient to examine the text of the message in order to
determine its relevance. The recipient's e-mail software can reduce but not
eliminate the time and effort required to sort incoming e-mail
messages.51 On some
computer systems, however, each incoming e-mail message causes the user's
computer to emit an audible or visual signal, and may even require the user to
press one or more keys to acknowledge the message. E-mail advertising can
therefore be somewhat more intrusive than faxes or direct mail, but it is
almost certainly less so than calls from
telemarketers.52
[1012]
Because it is so easy and inexpensive to send bulk e-mail, advertisers
are beginning to bombard recipients with such messages. The number of faxes
that can be sent by a fax advertiser is limited by the number of telephone
lines leased by the advertiser or its fax broadcast service, but no such
limitation applies to e-mail. Unsolicited e-mail advertising is likely to be
a burden to computer users because of the sheer number of such messages that
they receive, rather than simply because of the cost or inconvenience involved
in receiving and deleting a single message.
II. Statutory Construction
A. Statutory Language
The TCPA's definition of "telephone facsimile machine" (TFM) is stated
in terms of the function that such machines perform rather than the method
that they use.53 As
discussed above, a conventional fax machine transmits or receives a copy of a
printed document over a telephone line using standard fax protocols. An
e-mail message can also be a copy of a printed document transmitted or
received over a telephone line, using various e-mail and data communication
protocols. This confusion is
[1013]
the basis for most of the arguments that the "junk fax" ban also covers
e-mail.
A literal interpretation of the statutory definition of TFM would
include most personal computers in use today. A computer with a modem, a
printer, and appropriate software (normally sold bundled with the computer)
qualifies as a TFM under § 227(a)(2)(B).54 Adding a scanner would qualify the computer under
subsection (A), though a scanner is not necessary because the two subsections
are stated in the alternative.55 Furthermore, many computers include a fax modem,
which enables a computer to communicate with fax machines using standard fax
protocols as well as with other computers using data communication
protocols.56 The
distinction between computers and conventional fax machines has blurred
considerably, and most personal computers seem to fit squarely within the
statutory definition of a TFM. The permissive language in the definition is
further evidence that Congress intended a broad construction: a conventional
fax machine automatically transcribes documents onto paper, while a computer
merely "has the capacity" to do so.57
Perhaps the strongest argument against such a broad application of the
TCPA is based upon common sense: The ordinary, commonly understood meaning of
"telephone facsimile machine" includes neither computers nor electronic mail.
Congress almost certainly did not even consider the statute's applicability to
e-mail58; the breadth
of the statutory definition thus seems inadvertent. Nonetheless, absent
additional evidence of ambiguity, the fact that the statutory definition
differs from common usage
[1014]
probably does not justify rejecting a literal
interpretation.59
As a penal statute,60 the TCPA should be construed strictly. Language
elsewhere in the TCPA lends indirect support to a narrow construction.
Section 227(b)(1)(C) states that it is illegal "to use any telephone facsimile
machine, computer, or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a
telephone facsimile machine."61 If a computer qualifies as a TFM, then the term
"computer" in this provision would be
surplusage.62 While
it would be possible to send unsolicited faxes using a computer equipped with
a fax modem but neither a printer nor a scanner (which would thus not qualify
as a TFM), such a computer would certainly be included under "other device."
This subsection thus ought to be read as an indication that the drafters did
not intend the term TFM to include computers.
Another provision of the TCPA presents further evidence that Congress
never intended that the statute be applied to e-mail. Section 227(d) requires
that each TFM transmission be marked on at least the first page with the time
and date of transmission, the name of the sender, and the sender's telephone
number.63 Unlike
faxed documents, e-mail messages generally do not have "pages," and it makes
less sense to include the sender's telephone number on an e-mail message than
on a fax.64
Furthermore, when the TCPA was enacted, most fax machines already incorporated
a facility for automatically imprinting the identifying information specified
by § 227(d)(2).65 In-
[1015]
ternet e-mail messages, however, generally do not include the sender's
telephone number, and commonly-used e-mail software does not include a
telephone number as a standard data element. Applying the identifying information requirements
set forth in § 227(d)
to e-mail would therefore render illegal most of the
billions of e-mail messages sent each year. On the other hand, if outgoing
e-mail is not subject to those requirements, then incoming e-mail ought not be
subject to the prohibition on unsolicited advertisements in
§ 227(b)(1)(C) either.
Other language in and surrounding the TCPA is also relevant to its
construction. The TCPA was specifically directed at abuses of the telephone
system.67 The
preamble states that it is intended "to prohibit certain practices involving
the use of telephone equipment," and the word telephone appears in its
short title. Its context consists of other statutes that also pertain to the
telephone system.68
While a telephone line is inherent to a fax transmission, it is not
required for the transmission of e-mail.69 The sender of a fax knows the recipient's
telephone number and purposely addresses the transmission directly to the
recipient's telephone line. The sender of an e-mail message, on the other
hand, addresses the message to an e-mail address, and typically does not know
whether telephone lines will be used at any point during the transmission of
the message (other than at the sender's own
[1016]
end of the connection).70 Unlike conventional fax transmissions, therefore,
e-mail is only incidentally related to the telephone system, which casts some
doubt upon the TCPA's applicability to e-mail.
B. Legislative History
If the language of the TCPA yields contradictory conclusions about its
applicability to e-mail, then its legislative history is even less helpful.
Although e-mail was widely known by 199171 and unsolicited e-mail was already becoming a
nuisance,72 e-mail is
not even mentioned in any of the congressional reports or testimony related to
the TCPA. Nor is there any explanation of the statutory definition of
"telephone facsimile machine."73 The legislative history does indicate the reasons
behind the ban on unsolicited fax advertising, however, and for the most part
those reasons are equally applicable to unsolicited e-mail.
Congress began considering legislation to restrict unsolicited fax
advertising in 1989.74 The Facsimile Advertising Regulation Act
introduced that year would have required telephone companies to maintain lists
of customers who objected to receiving un-
[1017]
solicited fax advertisements, and rendered it unlawful to send unsolicited
advertisements to those on such lists.75 Several bills concerning telemarketing and fax
advertising were introduced over the next two years. The Telephone
Advertising Consumer Rights Act would have instructed the Federal
Communications Commission to prescribe rules to restrict unsolicited fax
advertising.76 The
version ultimately passed by the Senate would have prohibited unsolicited fax
advertising completely.77 A similar Senate bill, the Automated Telephone
Consumer Protection Act, also contained an outright ban on unsolicited fax
advertising.78 The
ban remained intact in the House version of that bill, by then renamed the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991
(TCPA),79 and the
Senate concurred in the House amendments.80
The TCPA was enacted in response to a variety of complaints about
telemarketing practices. The Congressional findings set forth in the act
describe telemarketing calls generally as a nuisance and an invasion of
privacy.81 The
findings do not mention problems attributed to unsolicited faxes, such as cost
shifting and tieing up telephone lines.82 Those two complaints do appear, however,
throughout the other documents that comprise the legislative history of the
TCPA and related bills.
[1018]
Representative Edward J. Markey, upon introducing the Facsimile
Advertising Regulation Act, described the problem as follows:
Unsolicited advertising is beginning to clog FAX lines,
restricting the owners' ability to use their machines for the
purposes they originally bought them for and generating operating
costs the users can't control. Unlike junk mail, which can be
discarded, or solicitation phone calls, which can be refused or
hung up, junk FAX ties up the recipient's line until it has been
received and printed. The recipient's machine is unavailable for
business and he or she incurs the high cost for supplies before
knowing whether the message is either wanted or
needed.83
Congress clearly was concerned about the cost-shifting effects of
unsolicited fax advertising. Representative Markey quoted a Washington
Post story that compared unsolicited faxes to "junk mail with the postage
due."84 Legislators
repeatedly complained about the cost of receiving and printing unsolicited
faxes, but they were probably more concerned with the fact that costs were
being shifted from advertisers to recipients than with the magnitude of those
costs.85
[1019]
Electronic mail has a similar cost-shifting effect. Although each
message normally involves a somewhat lower cost to the recipient than is true
of faxes, the cost-shifting effect--i.e., the cost borne by
recipients relative to that borne by advertisers--is even higher, because
unsolicited advertisements can be sent via e-mail at very low cost to the
sender, and advertisers have little or no incentive to reduce the volume of
e-mail advertisements.86
The other major area of concern was the inconvenience involved in
receiving unsolicited fax advertisements. Such advertisements could tie up a
fax machine when its owner had a "legitimate" use for
it.87 Unlike the
cost-shifting complaints, the inconvenience arguments were based
primarily on anecdotal evidence, such as accounts of "fax attacks" and similar
incidents.88
C. Administrative Interpretation
The Federal Communications Commission is charged with implementing the
regulatory aspects of the TCPA.89 The FCC's telemarketing rule paraphrases much of
the TCPA; its definition of TFM is identical to the statutory
definition.90 The
FCC has not stated whether a view on the applicability of the TCPA to
electronic mail. However, it has ruled that computer-based fax
[1020]
modems do qualify as TFMs.91 Because the FCC viewed the statute as "ambiguous"
on this question,92
however, it probably would not interpret the statute as including computers
capable of receiving and printing e-mail message, since this would require an
even broader construction of the definition.93
The language of the TCPA is ambiguous and even contradictory as to its
applicability to electronic mail, and neither the legislative history nor
administrative interpretations provide a clear answer. Therefore, the policy
implications of construing the TCPA to cover e-mail, along with the
availability and likely effectiveness of alternative approaches, should be the
primary bases for deciding how the statute ought to be interpreted.
III. Policy Implications
Interpreting the TCPA to cover unsolicited commercial e-mail would
promote several laudable policy objectives. First, like the ban on
unsolicited fax advertising, it would prevent marketers from shifting the
costs of advertising to consumers. Furthermore, the private right of action
created by the TCPA renders the statute self-enforcing; the problem of
unsolicited e-mail might be resolved without extensive regulatory
intervention.
Many people are understandably skeptical of governmental efforts to
regulate the Internet and online services. The Clipper chip
proposal,94 the
Communications Decency Act,95 Stratton
[1021]
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.,96 and similar events have produced considerable
suspicion regarding government's ability to comprehend the culture and
dynamics of computer networks. Indeed, even though the Internet itself traces
its origins to a federally funded computer network, it has a long history of
informal self-governance without governmental
interference.97 For
these reasons, even many opponents of unsolicited e-mail tend to resist
application of the TCPA or other laws to
e-mail.98
Another argument against federal regulation of e-mail relates to the
government's ability to exercise control over electronic communications.
Because the Internet and many online services are international networks, both
practical and constitutional constraints may leave a single jurisdiction with
little power to affect conduct that occurs or originates beyond its
borders.99 Bulk
e-mailers might well locate abroad to escape the applicability of the
TCPA.100
[1022]
Perhaps the strongest objection to a complete prohibition on unsolicited
e-mail advertising, however, is the effect that such a rule would have on
legitimate commercial expression. While a ban would probably withstand
constitutional scrutiny,101 it might well suppress advertising messages
lacking an economically feasible alternative outlet, thereby stifling
competition and innovation.102 Opponents of an outright ban also argue that a
market solution is preferable: consumers wishing to be protected from
unsolicited e-mail could choose a service provider such as America Online,
which prohibits such messages and attempts filter them out, while those who
want to receive e-mail advertisements (or who prefer to rely upon their own
filtering devices) could choose other
providers.103
The debate over unsolicited commercial e-mail may be somewhat slanted by
perceptions regarding its content and social value. E-mail advertising has
not achieved the legitimacy of traditional direct mail advertising. Sending
unsolicited e-mail
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and the related practice of posting articles to excessive numbers of Usenet
newsgroups are referred to disparagingly as
"spamming,"104 and
the most egregious offenders may find their names and other personal
information posted for public ridicule and
harassment.105
E-mail advertising is frequently used to promote fraudulent
get-rich-quick schemes and other questionable
ventures.106
Unsolicited e-mail advertisements often misrepresent the sender's identity or
the source of the recipient's name and e-mail
address.107
Unsolicited e-mail advertising as it presently exists is highly
inefficient, mainly because advertisers bear such a small share of the costs
that are involved. E-mail advertisers have no incentive to eliminate
duplicate or obsolete addresses from their lists. They also have little
incentive to target their marketing efforts.108 Nonetheless, it may be premature to ban all
unsolicited e-mail advertising, if for no other reason than because the
Internet is still in a period of rapid development, and a ban might prevent
the emergence of superior methods of addressing the problem. Many other
approaches have been suggested or are already in use, some of which may be
able to achieve the same or better results without the undesirable side
effects of a government-imposed ban.
IV. Alternative Solutions
While the TCPA as it presently stands may not cover electronic mail,
there are many other approaches to the unsolicited e-mail problem. First,
however, if an outright ban on unsolicited commercial e-mail is deemed
appropriate, the statutory con-
[1024]
struction problem could be solved simply by amending the TCPA to state
explicitly that unsolicited advertisements transmitted via electronic mail are
prohibited. Alternatively, a separate federal statute could be enacted to
prohibit unsolicited commercial e-mail.109 Legislation that would attempt this on a state
level has already been introduced in at least one
state,110 and
similar efforts are likely to follow
elsewhere.111
One set of responses to the unsolicited e-mail problem is
recipient-based: self-help initiatives undertaken by the recipients
of unsolicited messages. While reliance upon such efforts leaves the burden
upon recipients, it does avoid the risks of overregulation and may maximize
individual choice and the ability to adapt to technological advances.
Another set of responses is regulatory in nature, with standards to be
established by either government or the participants themselves (network
service providers, advertisers, or both). Self-regulation may well be
the best option, but it may be difficult to secure unanimous agreement on what
rules should apply to e-mail advertising.112
A. Self-Help Efforts
Many Internet users have attempted to stem the tide of unsolicited
commercial e-mail messages by keeping their own e-mail addresses private.
E-mail advertisers obtain addresses from a number of places; two of the
primary sources seem to be the online directories available on services such
as America On-
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line, and messages posted to Internet discussion forums, including mailing
lists and Usenet newsgroups. By declining to be included in online service
directories and omitting or disguising one's e-mail address in publicly posted
messages, it may be possible to prevent an address from finding its way onto
many advertisers' lists.113 Many Internet users maintain two or more
different addresses in order to reserve one for personal or
non-commercial messages;114 some companies use random character strings for
addresses instead of surnames in order to prevent outsiders from guessing
employees' e-mail addresses.115
Concealing one's e-mail address, however, is not a satisfactory solution
for many Internet users, just as not everyone (even in California) wants to
have an unlisted telephone number. Publishing one's fax number is not
considered an invitation to advertisers who wish to send unsolicited
faxes;116 similarly,
publishing an e-mail address should not create a presumption that its owner is
willing to bear the cost of unsolicited advertising messages.
Recipients of unwanted commercial e-mail messages often complain to the
sender, asking to be removed from the sender's mailing
list.117 Many
e-mail advertisers include instructions for such removal in the text of
advertising messages that they send.118 Similar "opt-out" systems are used by
telemarketers (as required by the TCPA119) and direct mail
marketers.120
Unfortu-
[1026]
nately, these removal requests seem to be ignored as often as they are
honored,121 and in
some cases such a request may even lead to more rather than fewer unsolicited
messages.122 And
because many e-mail advertisers do not include a valid return address in their
messages, it is not always possible to make a removal
request.123
Furthermore, the need to respond to each unsolicited advertisement with a
separate removal request will become increasingly burdensome as the volume of
unsolicited e-mail advertising increases.
A third recipient-based approach is to filter incoming e-mail,
attempting to delete unwanted messages efficiently in order to minimize wasted
time and resources.124 However, filters are far from perfect, and many
unsolicited commercial messages are likely to slip
through.125 It is
difficult to filter out advertisements automatically without risking deletion
of other correspondence,126 and even the more efficient filters still do not
completely prevent network resources from being consumed by unwanted
messages.127 While
filtering technologies undoubtedly will improve over time, it is likely that
the volume of advertising messages will increase and e-mail advertisers will
become more adept at evading filters. Mandatory labelling of commercial
e-mail messages, discussed below, would make effective filtering
possible.128
[1027]
Finally, an increasing number of Internet users are resorting to
retaliation against e-mail advertisers: directing hostile "flames" at the
advertiser; flooding the advertiser with e-mail messages, telephone calls, or
faxes; and posting information about the advertiser on World Wide Web pages or
Internet discussion forums.129 Many e-mail advertisers are now very cautious
about the contact information they provide as a result of such
tactics.130 While
these tactics may work on occasion, they can be illegal, and they tend to be
ineffective at shifting costs back to the advertiser or otherwise deterring
unsolicited e-mail marketing.131 E-mail bombs, for example, place the greatest
burdens on the sender's and the advertiser's Internet providers, neither of
which may even be aware of the advertiser's
activities.132
Blacklists and similar attempts to castigate or boycott bulk e-mailers seem to
have had little effect.133 Furthermore, some e-mail advertisers have
counter-attacked by including names of previous objectors in future
advertising messages, subjecting them to retaliation by other incensed
Internet users.134
B. Regulatory Approaches
The ineffectiveness of self-help efforts has led many Internet
users to call upon government, network service providers, and advertisers to
address the problem of unsolicited commercial e-mail. Several industry groups
have already ventured into
[1028]
the area, including the Direct Marketing Association and the Interactive
Services Association, which in 1996 jointly published a set of principles for
unsolicited marketing e-mail.135 Many Internet service providers have adopted
acceptable use policies prohibiting unsolicited e-mail messages and refuse to
cooperate with providers that permit such
practices.136
Because of the decentralized nature of the Internet and the low cost of
entering the bulk e-mail market, however, self-regulatory efforts largely
have failed to solve the unsolicited e-mail problem, and calls for government
action are gaining increasing momentum.
One relatively uncontroversial requirement would force commercial e-mail
messages to identify the sender and include a valid return e-mail
address.137 Such
identification is generally required by existing e-mail protocols, but bulk
e-mailers often circumvent this requirement, probably to avoid the retaliatory
tactics discussed earlier.138 Sender identification would enable recipients to
filter out subsequent messages from bulk e-mailers, provide them with a means
of requesting removal from mailing lists, and possibly make it reduce the
incidence of fraudulent schemes advertised by e-mail. The TCPA requires
sender identification for fax transmissions,139 and a similar requirement ought to apply to
commercial e-mail messages.140
[1029]
A related rule would mandate that commercial or bulk e-mail messages
bear a prominent label, most likely a predefined code at the beginning of the
subject line or elsewhere in the message
header.141
Labelling messages would enable recipients to filter them out effectively,
perhaps even selectively, and would reduce the likelihood that recipients
would be misled by advertisements disguised as personal messages. Mandatory
labelling is less intrusive than an outright ban: it places fewer restraints
upon commercial speech, and it reduces or eliminates the need for Internet
service providers and commercial online services to do their own blocking and
filtering. However, like the sender identification requirement, it still
fails to address the larger issue of bandwidth consumption, since the volume
of unsolicited messages transmitted over the Internet is likely to increase
even more dramatically with effective labelling and filtering
systems.142
Direct marketers have long favored opt-out systems over opt-in
systems,143 mainly
because few consumers take the time to opt either way. Permitting those who
do not wish to receive advertisements to opt out is a reasonable solution in
the case of direct mail advertising, since the burden imposed upon the
recipient is relatively small, and the volume of advertising material is
constrained by the costs borne by the advertiser. Telemarketers are also
permitted to use an opt-out system, provided they comply with federal
regulations pertaining to the maintenance of "do-not-call"
lists.144 Because
fax transmissions shift quantifiable costs to the recipient, however, the TCPA
pro-
[1030]
hibits unsolicited fax advertising, effectively mandating an opt-in
system.145 An
analogous argument can be made in support of an opt-in system for e-mail
advertising.
E-mail advertisers urge Internet users to accept an opt-out system,
promising to keep track of those individuals who request to be removed from
mailing lists.146
Industry groups have also raised the possibility of a universal exclusion
list, which would eliminate the need for individuals to submit separate
removal requests to each bulk e-mailer.147 While the proliferation of e-mail advertisers
will likely make company-specific exclusion lists relatively worthless, a
universal list would probably afford adequate protection to consumers,
provided that all (or nearly all) bulk e-mailers participated in the
system.148
While most of the direct marketing industry is hostile to opt-in
systems, some advertisers have used such systems to their advantage. One bulk
e-mailer, for example, urges advertisers to build "politically correct"
mailing lists comprised of people who have voluntarily signed up to receive
e-mail on specific topics.149 Another possibility would be to permit
advertisers to send a single, brief e-mail message inquiring as to the
recipient's willingness to receive advertising material, either in general or
by subject matter categories. If advertisers were to share their lists of
persons who objected to or declined such inquiries (in effect, maintaining an
industry-wide opt-out list), the objectors would not be subjected to
repeated inquiries.
An approach likely to be attractive to many Internet users would permit
recipients of e-mail advertisements to collect fees from advertisers in
exchange for reading their messages. Some Internet users have attempted to
institute such a system unilaterally, informing bulk e-mailers that they
assess a specified fee
[1031]
for receiving or "proofreading" each unsolicited commercial message directed
to their accounts.150 Ultimately, most such fees function punitively;
even with a very high response rate, few bulk e-mailers would really be
willing to pay a fee of up to $500 to each potential customer, and the
enforceability of such unilaterally imposed contracts is
questionable.151
A payment system that probably makes more sense in the long term would
be one in which advertisers automatically pay recipients a much lower fee for
each message, either predetermined or negotiated at the time that the message
is transmitted.152
Future developments in electronic commerce will enable such transactions to be
performed efficiently at the level of 10 cents or less, which still is
significantly lower than the cost of sending a direct mail piece or making a
telemarketing call. Such micropayment schemes are currently in development,
but are not yet available to most Internet
users.153
Conclusion
Unsolicited electronic mail messages, most of which are commercial in
nature, represent a growing problem for users of online services and the
Internet. The Telephone Consumer Protection Act's overbroad definition of a
"telephone facsimile machine" makes it possible to construe the Act's
prohibition on unsolicited fax advertising as also applicable to unsolicited
e-mail messages. Faxes and e-mail share many of the same characteristics, and
in particular both shift costs onto the recipient of a communication. This
cost-shifting effect was the primary basis
[1032]
for the prohibition on unsolicited fax advertising, and could be used to
justify applying the same law to e-mail. However, Congress almost certainly
did not anticipate such a construction, and the Federal Communications
Commission, which administers the statute, has not expressed no opinion on the
matter. It therefore seems unlikely that the TCPA in its present form would
be construed to prohibit unsolicited e-mail advertising.
Nonetheless, efforts to regulate unsolicited e-mail can be expected to
gain momentum as the problem grows. Within a year or two several states may
have attempted to ban e-mail advertising or require that it be clearly
labeled. While Internet service providers and individual Internet users will
continue to exert pressure on e-mail advertisers, technological advances and
the decentralized nature of the Internet should enable advertisers to
circumvent most such efforts. Mandatory labelling in particular seems to be a
desirable solution from the perspective of computer users, but labelling also
does not adequately address the technical problems posed by unsolicited
messages and still would be subject to circumvention by determined
advertisers.
The best solution may be one that combines industry initiatives such as
voluntary labelling and universal exclusion lists with technical approaches
such as filtering and mail blocking. Individual Internet users could choose
from service providers that supply various levels of protection from
unsolicited messages, and ideally providers could design e-mail services
individually tailored to each customer's preferences. The role to be played
by micropayment systems is less clear, though the availability of such systems
likely will promote more efficient use of resources and could provide a
partial solution to the cost-shifting problem.
45 Buffalo L. Rev. 1001 (1997)
Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail and the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991
David E. Sorkin*
Notes
* Assistant Professor of Law and Associate Director of the
Center for Information Technology
and Privacy Law, The John Marshall
Law School, e-mail 7sorkin@jmls.edu. The
author wishes to express his thanks to Steven McAuley (John Marshall Class of 1998),
who provided valuable research assistance, and to Mark Eckenwiler, Esq., whose
March 1996
NetGuide column suggested the topic for this article. This Article was
submitted to the Buffalo Law Review on January 22, 1997, and was accepted for
publication in the Spring 1997 issue on February 9, 1997. The Article does not
reflect developments that occurred after this date, including the introduction of
several relevant bills in Congress and various state legislatures and decisions
rendered by several state and federal courts, although some of the citations have been
updated by the staff of the Buffalo Law Review. For information on recent
legal developments related to unsolicited e-mail, see
<http://www.jmls.edu/cyber/index/spam.html>.
1. Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394 (codified as amended at
47
U.S.C. § 227 (1994)).
2. See S. Rep. No.
102-178, at 3 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968, 1970; see
also 137 Cong. Rec. H11,314
(daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (statement of Rep. Markey) ("We are sending instructions
over to the FCC that we want them to begin the process here of shutting down the abuse
of the telephones and fax machines that have grown over the last half a decade.").
3. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 227(b)(1)(A), (D).
4. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 227(b)(1)(B).
5. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 227(c); 47 C.F.R.
§ 64.1200 (1996).
6. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 227(b)(1)(C).
7. See 136 Cong.
Rec. H5820 (daily ed. July 30, 1990) (statement of Rep. Markey) ("[W]ith the
growth in use of the fax machines has come 'junk fax,' the electronic equivalent of
junk mail.").
8. See infra note 20 and
accompanying text.
9. 47 U.S.C.
§ 227(a)(2).
10. See infra text
accompanying notes 53-57.
11. See, e.g., Daniel Akst, Junk Mail: The Battle
Continues, L.A. Times, May 27,
1996, at D1; Mark
Eckenwiler, Just the Fax, Ma'am,
NetGuide, Mar. 1996, at 37; Bob
Henry, Does Fax Ad Prohibition Bear on E-Mail Spamming?,
CommunicationsWeek, Nov. 25, 1996,
at 40; Steven William Rimmer, Death to Spam: A Guide to Dealing with Unwanted
E-Mail Sept. 22, 1997,
<http://www.mindworkshop.com/alchemy/nospam.html>; Russ Smith,
What's Covered by the TCPA?, Sept. 7, 1997,
<http://www.russ-smith.com/whats.asp>; Mark J. Welch,
Broadcast Fax and Junk Email Illegal, Sept. 23, 1997,
<http://www.ca-probate.com/faxlaw.htm>.
12. Section 227(b)(3)(B) of the TCPA provides for statutory damages of
$500 for each violation. Robert Arkow of California filed a small claims action
against CompuServe in February 1995 based upon this provision, seeking $1,000 in
statutory damages for two unsolicited e-mail advertisements he received from
CompuServe, and an additional $1,000 in punitive damages based upon his claim that he
had previously notified CompuServe of his desire not to receive such messages. The
parties settled under undisclosed terms. See Robert A. Cronkleton, Junk on
the E-Mail, Kansas City Star,
Mar. 12, 1996, at F2; Bruce V. Bigelow, Infuriated Client Sues over Junk
E-Mail, San Diego Union-Trib.,
Feb. 19, 1995, at H1; Bill Husted, Return to Sender,
Atlanta J. & Const., Feb. 15,
1995, § E, at 2; Eckenwiler, supra note 11.
13. See Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1995) (rejecting First
Amendment challenge to ban on prerecorded calls to residences), rev'g 826 F.
Supp. 360 (D. Or. 1993); Destination Ventures, Ltd., v. FCC, 46 F.3d 54 (9th Cir.
1995) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to ban on unsolicited fax advertisements),
aff'g 844 F. Supp. 632 (D. Or. 1994).
14. See, e.g., Deborah L. Hamilton, Note, The First Amendment
Status of Commercial Speech: Why the FCC Regulations Implementing the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991 Are Unconstitutional, 94
Mich. L. Rev. 2352 (1996); Paul S.
Zimmerman, Note and Comment, Hanging Up on Commercial Speech: Moser v. FCC, 71
Wash. L. Rev. 571 (1996); Howard E.
Berkenblit, Note, Can Those Telemarketing Machines Keep Calling Me?--The
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 After Moser v. FCC, 36
B.C. L. Rev. 85 (1994).
15. See Lutz Appellate Servs. v. Curry, 859 F. Supp. 180 (E.D. Pa.
1994).
16. Robert Arkow's suit terminated in an undisclosed settlement.
See supra note 12. While it is possible that
other courts have addressed unsolicited e-mail claims under the TCPA, searches of
federal and state case law and relevant Internet discussion forums revealed no such
reports as of December 1996.
This Article focuses on unsolicited e-mail messages that are commercial in
nature. While most opponents of unsolicited bulk e-mail do not distinguish between
commercial and noncommercial messages, see, e.g., Scott Hazen Mueller,
Serving Spam, Dec. 19, 1996, Post No. 4,
<http://www.hotwired.com/braintennis/96/51/index3a.html>, the TCPA applies
only to "unsolicited advertisement[s]." 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). In any event,
most unsolicited bulk e-mail currently seems to be commercial in nature. See
Abby Franquemont-Guillory, Unsolicited versus Commercial Email, Sept. 24,
1997, <http://www.vix.com/spam/others/uce.html>; Steven William Rimmer,
Death to Spam: A Guide to Dealing with Unwanted E-Mail Sept. 22, 1997,
<http://www.mindworkshop.com/alchemy/nospam.html>.
17. See Richard G. Barrows, Fax Law--A Compendium of
Reported Cases, Law Prac. Mgmt.,
Nov./Dec. 1991, at 28; Patricia Bordman, Telefacsimile Documents: A Survey of Uses
in the Legal Profession, 36 Wayne L.
Rev. 1361, 1361-62 & n.6 (1990). The facsimile machine was invented in
1842. See Barrows, supra, at 28.
18. See Jerry Hirsch, The Fax: It's Not Just for Business,
Orange County Reg., Jan. 31, 1994,
at D23 (25 million fax machines and fax modems in U.S.); Phil Waga, Fax Machines
Making Couriers Obsolete, Gannett News Service, Dec. 8, 1992, available in
LEXIS, News Library, US File (10.1 million fax machines in 1991, up from 300,000 in
1983); 136 Cong. Rec. H5818 (daily
ed. July 30, 1990) (statement of Rep. Markey) (2 million fax machines).
19. See 136 Cong.
Rec. H5818 (daily ed. July 30, 1990) (statement of Rep. Markey) (30 billion
pages are faxed each year).
20. See Bradford W. Hildebrandt, The Use of Facsimile by Law
Firms, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 11, 1986,
at 4; George Pajari, Comp.dcom.fax FAQ: Glossary and Background Information,
June 16, 1996, <http://www.faximum.com/faqs/fax.glossary>. The Group III
designation refers to a standard defined by the International Telephone and Telegraph
Consultative Committee (CCITT), now known as the International Telecommunication
Union's Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T), and the Electronics Industry
Association (EIA), which publishes a U.S. version of the standard. See
ITU-T,
Recommendation T.4: Standardization of Group
3 Facsimile Apparatus for Document Transmission (rev. 1993);
Electronics Industries Ass'n,
EIA-465: Group 3 Facsimile Apparatus for
Document Transmission (1981).
21. A Congressional committee considering a predecessor bill to the TCPA
noted that an advertiser with a single fax machine could send tens of thousands of
unsolicited messages per week. See
H.R. Rep. 102-317, at 6-7 (1991).
Businesses received an average of three to four unsolicited faxes per week before the
TCPA was enacted. See Edwin J. Broecker, Note, FAX unto Others ...: A
Constitutional Analysis of Unsolicited Facsimile Statutes, 23
Ind. L. Rev. 703, 704 n.8 (1990).
Fax advertising was used by many different types of businesses. See, e.g., 135
Cong. Rec. E1462 (daily ed. May 2,
1989 (statement of Rep. Markey); 137 Cong.
Rec. S9840 (daily ed. July 11, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings). One of
the leading fax advertisers was Sanford Wallace, who now runs Cyber Promotions, an
e-mail marketing firm. See Jana Sanchez-Klein, Meet the Most Hated Man
on the Internet, Balt. Sun, May
28, 1996, at 1D.
22. Connecticut enacted the first statute banning unsolicited fax
advertisements in 1989; several other states followed with similar legislation.
See Robert Estill, Junk Fax Glut Stirs Cry for Ban,
San Diego Union-Trib., Nov. 12,
1989, at A1. The federal TCPA was passed by Congress in November 1991 and signed into
law by President George Bush on December 23, 1991.
23. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(4), (b)(1)(C) (1994).
24. See generally Brian G. Gilpin, Note, Attorney Advertising
and Solicitation on the Internet: Complying with Ethics Regulations and
Netiquette, 13 J. Marshall J. Computer
& Info. L. 697, 721 (1995) ("Electronic mail is transmitted over phone
lines, local area networks, fiber optic networks, satellite links, or a combination
thereof.").
25. Like a fax machine, a modem converts data to an audible signal that
can be transmitted over a telephone line. A modem normally uses an asynchronous
full-duplex modulation scheme and maintains a constant transmission speed
throughout a connection, however, while a fax machine uses a synchronous
half-duplex scheme and switches to a lower speed to transmit control information
between pages. See George Pajari, Comp.dcom.fax FAQ: Frequently Asked
Questions about Fax, Nov. 8, 1996,
<http://www.faximum.com/faqs/fax.questions>. While some data
modems use proprietary compression schemes, most comply with industry standards such
as V.34, a standard for 28.8 kbps modems. See
ITU-T,
Recommendation V.34 (1994).
A computer-based fax modem combines the capabilities of a fax machine and a
data modem, and can communicate with both types of devices. Most computers sold today
include a fax modem. See Jerry Hirsch, The Fax: It's Not Just for
Business, Orange County Reg.
(California), Jan. 31, 1994, at D23.
Users of computer bulletin board systems (BBSs) commonly exchange e-mail over
telephone lines. Individuals can also send and receive e-mail using commercial online
services and Internet service providers, both of which normally offer dial-up
connections.
26. Interconnections between major networks, now commonplace, were once a
primary basis for selecting an e-mail provider. See Brock N. Meeks, E-Mail
Economics, Byte, Apr. 1, 1989,
at 151 (noting that only two of four popular e-mail services profiled were
interconnected to one another).
27. Other e-mail systems vary in transmission speeds. A message sent
between two computers on the same local area network normally arrives almost
instantaneously. A message sent between subscribers of two different FidoNet BBSs, on
the other hand, typically arrives the day after it is sent, because FidoNet BBSs
connect to one another via telephone calls made late at night. See Daniel Akst
& James Weissman, The Other Internet--FidoNet Turns Local BBSes into Part
of a Global Network, NetGuide,
Sept. 1, 1995, at 57.
28. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace, 28
Conn. L. Rev. 1095, 1097 (1996);
Alexander Gigante, Black Hole in Cyberspace: The Legal Void in the Internet,
15 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info.
L. 413 (1997); Henry H. Perritt Jr., Dispute Resolution in Electronic
Network Communities, 38 Vill. L.
Rev. 349, 352 n.7 (1993).
29. See Martin Grossmann, Some Words About X.400, SMTP, and
VMS-Mail, Oct. 24, 1995,
<http://psiclc.psi.ch/www_aco_hn/docs/mail/protocols.html>; SMTP Resources
Directory (András Salamon & Brad Knowles eds.), Jan. 8, 1997,
<http://www.dns.net/smtprd/>; Free On-line Dictionary of
Computing (Denis Howe ed.) <http://wfn-shop.princeton.edu/foldoc/> (spot: electronic mail,
simple mail transfer protocol). The SMTP specification appears in Jonathan B. Postel,
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (Network Working Group Request for Comments No.
821), Aug. 1982, <http://ds.internic.net/rfc/rfc821.txt>.
30. The X.400 protocol, for example, was defined by the International
Telephone and Telegraph Consultative Committee (CCITT), which now is the
telecommunication standardization sector of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU-T). See Free
On-line Dictionary of Computing, supra note 29 (spot:
X.400, International Telecommunications Union);
ITU-T,
Recommendation F.400/X.400: Message Handling
Service: Message Handling Service and System Overview (rev. 1996).
Electronic data interchange (EDI) transmissions generally use the
American National Standards Institute
(ANSI) X12 standard; EDIFACT, the global standard; or a proprietary data exchange
standard. See Free On-line Dictionary of Computing, supra
note 29 (spot: electronic data interchange);
Benjamin Wright,
The Law of Electronic Commerce
§ 1.1.4 (2d ed. 1995).
31. See, e.g., Nothing but Net: Quit Stalling. Read This. Get
on the Net, Wash. Post, Apr. 24,
1995, at R6 (1 billion/month); David Hoye, E-Mail Hits 1 Billion Sent Each
Month, Phoenix Gazette, May 8,
1995, at C1 (same, up from 230 million/month in 1992); Julie Schmit, Pacific Bell
Speeds E-mail on Internet, USA
Today, Dec. 18, 1995, at 6B (1 billion/day); Scot Lehigh, Lost in the
(E-)Mail, Boston Globe, Nov. 24,
1996, at D1 (stating that 560 billion e-mail messages are sent per year).
32. "Electronic discussion forums" include Usenet newsgroups, mailing
lists, chat areas, web-based discussion areas, and other forums in which messages
are exchanged among groups of people. Some of these use electronic mail to transport
the messages, while others use different communication protocols. This Article is
concerned more with individual and bulk e-mail messages than with messages posted to
discussion forums, though some of the same technology and protocols (such as
listserver software programs) may be involved.
33. While anticommercialism is partially a relic of the academic and
research-oriented network that preceded the Internet, it has probably been perpetuated
by the nature of many early Internet advertisers, including lawyers, pornographers,
multilevel marketers, and snake-oil vendors. See infra
notes 104-107 and
accompanying text.
34. A single Internet e-mail message can be addressed to multiple
recipients, and can be sent at very little cost to the sender. See James
Gleick, Hold the Spam, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 22, 1996, § 6, at 22 ("[H]umanity has never before
encountered a form of advertising that costs its senders so little. . . .
Anyone with an Internet connection and a list of E-mail addresses can send millions of
letters for, roughly, nothing."). As one e-mail advertiser explained: "It's just as
cost effective for me to send to 6 million e-mail addresses as to 1 million e-mail
addresses, so why bother being selective?" Simson Garfinkel, Spam King! Your
Source for Spams Netwide!,
Wired, Feb. 1996 (quoting Jeff
Slaton).
35. Cf. Jon Udell, Push Me, Pull You,
Byte, Sept. 1, 1996, at 117
(complaining that many people send large documents by e-mail rather than simply
posting them on the web).
36. One e-mail marketer, Cyber Promotions, sends over two million e-mail
advertisements each day. See James Coates, Electronic Junk Mail Cluttering
Cyberspace: America Online Sued for Blocking Pitches,
Chi. Trib., Sept. 23, 1996, at C1.
As early as 1991, The Wall Street Journal reported that one executive "decided
not to read his e-mail when he printed it out one day and had 30 feet of messages."
William M. Bulkeley, Sifting the Junk Out of E-Mail,
Wall St. J., Feb. 28, 1991, at B1;
see also Rochelle Sharpe, Work Week,
Wall St. J., Nov. 22, 1994, at A1
(noting that top executives receive up to 300 "junk e-mail" messages per day).
37. Other common responses include requesting or demanding to be removed
from the sender's mailing list; directing "flames" or mailbombs to the sender; and
complaining to the sender's Internet service provider or in a public discussion forum.
See infra note 129.
38. See infra notes
83-85 and accompanying text.
39. See Jan Norman, Reasonable Facsimiles,
Orange County Reg., Mar. 25, 1996,
at D14; Just the Fax?, Consumer
Rep., Sept. 1996, at 28. It is possible to receive a fax without printing it
out at all, using either a computer-based fax modem or a fax machine which holds
received faxes in memory or forwards them to another machine. See Michael M.
Parker, Fax Pas: Stopping the Junk Fax Mail Bandwagon, 71
Or. L. Rev. 457, 461 n.18, 481
(1992) (discussing use of computer-based fax modems to filter incoming faxes);
Hildebrandt, supra note 20, at 4 (discussing forwarding
of faxes). Often, however, these approaches can cost more in time and equipment than
they save in fax machine supplies. See Norman, supra; Parker,
supra, at 461 n.18, 481.
40. See Just the Fax?,
Consumer Rep., Sept. 1996, at 28
(stating that more expensive fax machines that employ laser printing technology can
print at a slightly lower cost).
41. See Hildebrandt, supra note 20
(noting that most law firms simplify recordkeeping by charging a fixed cost per page
for faxes sent, and not charging at all for those received, based upon the fact that
faxes sent and received usually involve the same clients).
42. Larger online services and national Internet service providers
generally have local access numbers in most major cities, but individuals in less
populated areas often must pay long distance charges. In areas with local measured
telephone service, individuals may pay for calls to local access numbers, either by
the call or by the minute. Such costs do not apply to faxes, because telephone
charges for fax transmissions are normally borne by the sender.
In 1996 most consumers paid hourly rates for access to commercial online
services. See Wendy R. Leibowitz, Do Junkmailers Have Right to Send
Unwanted E-mail?, Nat'l L.J.,
Oct. 21, 1996, at A7. The industry trend, however, seems to be toward flat-rate
access, and most online services and Internet service providers now offer flat-rate
access, at least as an option. In December 1996, America Online, the largest online
service, shifted most of its subscribers to flat-rate accounts. See Peter H.
Lewis, New Flat Rate Creates Surge In Use of America Online,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1996, § D,
at 2. But some providers are reconsidering flat-rate access, and many charge a higher
rate for untimed accounts than they do for those with hourly fees. See
Elizabeth Weise, Some Providers Turn Back Clock,
Dayton Daily News, Jan. 11, 1997, at
4B.
43. See Wide-Area Networks: Update and Prognosis, Part 2,
Seybold Rep. on Desktop Pub., May
20, 1996, at 4, available in 1996 WL 9310538.
44. Some providers assess charges for disk space consumed by stored files
including e-mail messages, in addition to charges for time spent online. Others
impose disk space quotas or even delete incoming messages when such quotas are
reached. See, e.g., Gulf Coast Internet Co., Acceptable Use Policies,
Dec. 4, 1996, <http://www.gulf.net/acceptable_use_policies.html>. One bulk
e-mailer maintains a reserve fund to reimburse recipients of its advertisements for
surcharges assessed by their Internet providers, but claims that such surcharges are
extremely rare. See Robert Hicks, Profiting from Electronic Bulk Mail: Use
an Aggressive Approach That Respects Internet Users,
DM News, Aug. 5, 1996, at 35.
45. Unlike faxes, incoming e-mail messages can be filtered by the
recipient relatively easily, depending upon the recipient's e-mail software.
Sophisticated filtering programs can sort incoming messages by sender, subject matter,
and other parameters, and can discard messages from unrecognized senders unread.
See Hiawatha Bray, Getting Rid of Junk E-Mail,
Boston Globe, Sept. 26, 1996, at D1;
Daniel Akst, Info-Overloaded? Maybe It's Time to Embrace the Miracle of
Filters, L.A. Times, Aug. 19,
1996, at D1; William M. Bulkeley, Sifting the Junk out of E-Mail,
Wall St. J., Feb. 28, 1991, at B1.
Some Internet users maintain multiple e-mail addresses for different purposes to help
them prioritize messages that they receive.
While it is easy to delete unwanted e-mail messages, it is much more difficult
to refuse delivery of such messages in the first place. The receiving mail server
(normally a computer maintained by the Internet service provider or online service,
not the end user) can refuse connections from known bulk e-mailers, but doing so may
block all incoming messages from other subscribers of such "rogue" sites, and bulk
e-mailers frequently circumvent such measures by forging mail headers and routing
messages through intermediate computers. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber
Promotions, Inc., No. C2-96-1070 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 23, 1996)
<http://www.jmls.edu/cyber/cases/cs-cp1.html>. America Online
recently instituted a feature that automatically deletes incoming messages from known
bulk e-mailers, but AOL's mail system apparently still accepts delivery of each
message before deleting it. See
Cyber Promotions,
Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 456 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Coates,
supra note 36.
46. See Sally Hambridge, Netiquette Guidelines at 5 (Network
Working Group Request for Comments No. 1855), Oct. 1995,
<http://ds.internic.net/rfc/rfc1855.txt>.
47. One bulk e-mailer has offered to send messages to 500,000 people for
$500. See R. Lee Sullivan, You've Got Spam,
Forbes, Jan. 22, 1996, at 37. A
distributor of bulk e-mail software claims that its program can send about 1000
messages per hour using an ordinary dial-up Internet account. See Mailloop
Software, Mailloop Overview (visited Dec. 8, 1996)
<http://www.mailloop.com/overview.html>.
48. See H.R. Rep.
102-317, at 25 (1991). Many fax machines will automatically redial a number
periodically upon receiving a busy signal, but may give up after a specified number of
attempts. In any event, a fax machine that is tied up receiving a transmission is
unavailable for use in transmitting or receiving another document at the time,
potentially causing great inconvenience to the user of the machine.
49. See supra note 45.
50. "Unlike other communications media, the telephone commands our instant
attention. Junk mail can be thrown away. Television commercials can be turned off.
The telephone demands to be answered." 137
Cong. Rec. S18,317 (daily ed. Nov.
26, 1991) (statement of Sen. Pressler).
51. See supra note 45.
52. Some computer users probably consider anonymous bulk e-mail (messages
sent without a return address or other identification of the sender, or even with a
false return address) to be more intrusive than telephone calls, since there is no way
for the recipient to register his or her displeasure about receiving the message.
Cf. The Automated Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, S. 1462; The
Telephone Advertising Consumer Protection Act, S. 1410; and Equal Billing for Long
Distance Charges, S. 857, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 102d Cong. 9 (1991)
(statement of Steve Hamm, Adm'r, S.C. Dep't of Consumer Affairs) (noting that
recipients of automated telemarketing calls "wish they had the ability to slam the
telephone down on a live human being").
Another burden of unsolicited e-mail that is sometimes mentioned is the risk of
contracting a computer virus. See, e.g., Coates, supra
note 36. A virus cannot be transmitted as a normal e-mail
message, although an e-mail message may have an attached file containing executable
program code that includes a virus. The recipient thus would have to decode and run
the attached file to contract the virus, although some e-mail programs can do this
automatically. See Les Jones, Good Times Virus Hoax Frequently Asked
Questions, Dec. 21, 1996,
<http://www.public.usit.net/lesjones/goodtimes.html>. The risk
of computer viruses may be much smaller than most people believe. See Rob
Rosenberger, Computer Virus Myths, Oct. 4, 1997,
<http://www.kumite.com/myths/> (referring to sensationalistic
media coverage and exaggerated claims by producers of antivirus software);
Computer Incident Advisory Capability, U.S.
Dep't of Energy, Bulletin No. H-05,
Internet Hoaxes: PKZ300, Irina, Good Times, Deeyenda, Ghost, Nov. 20, 1996,
<http://ciac.llnl.gov/ciac/bulletins/h-05.shtml> (noting that
CIAC spends "much more time de-bunking hoaxes than handling real virus
incidents").
53. See supra note 9 and
accompanying text.
54. One possible distinction is that a conventional fax machine is a
single piece of equipment that meets the statutory definition, while a computer system
includes two or more separate components which satisfy the definition only
collectively. However, the statute defines a TFM using a collective noun
("equipment"), see 47 U.S.C.
§ 227(a)(2), and elsewhere it uses the singular noun "device" to refer to both a
computer and a TFM, see § 227(b)(1)(C).
55. Earlier versions of the TCPA and related legislation defined the term
TFM conjunctively (as equipment capable of both sending and receiving faxes),
see, e.g., H.R. 2184, 101st Cong. (1989), reprinted in Telemarketing
Practices: Hearing on H.R. 628, H.R. 2131, and H.R. 2184 Before the Subcomm. on
Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st
Cong. 12-15 (1989); H.R. 2921, 101st Cong., 136
Cong. Rec. H5818 (daily ed. July 30,
1990), or merely as equipment capable of sending faxes, see, e.g., S. 1462,
102d Cong., 137 Cong. Rec. S9874
(daily ed. July 11, 1991).
56. See supra note 25.
57. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(2).
58. See infra text
accompanying notes 71-88.
59. See 1A Norman J.
Singer, Statutes and Statutory
Construction § 20.08 (5th ed. 1993). But see 2A
Norman J. Singer,
Statutes and Statutory Construction,
§ 47.38 (5th ed. 1992) (a court may supply words omitted due to
inadvertence).
60. Willful violations of the TCPA are subject to punishment by fine or
imprisonment under 47 U.S.C.
§ 501 (1994).
61. 47 U.S.C.
§ 227(b)(1)(C).
62. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 (1979) (referring
to "the elementary canon of construction that a statute should be interpreted so as
not to render one part inoperative").
63. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 227(d)(1), (2). The FCC has interpreted § 227(d)(2) to require merely
that fax machines be capable of marking the identifying information automatically once
the user has supplied the information to the machine. See Rules &
Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 10 F.C.C.R.
12,391, ¶ 21 (1995).
64. It is unclear whether the telephone number disclosure requirement was
intended merely to identify the sender or to provide the recipient with a convenient
means of responding. (The telephone number provided may be either a voice or a fax
number. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 227(d)(1)(B), (d)(2).) In either case, a more appropriate analog for e-mail
messages would probably be to require inclusion of a valid return e-mail address
rather than a telephone number, though the language of the statute provides no basis
for such a requirement.
65. See S. Rep. No.
102-178, at 9 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968, 1976. Actually,
manufacturers of "low-end" fax machines requested that enforcement of this requirement
be delayed, claiming that such machines did not automatically imprint the date and
time on each document. See Rules & Regulations Implementing the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 7 F.C.C.R. 8660 (1992). The FCC denied the
manufacturers' request, effectively mandating that all fax machines include an
internal clock. See id.; Rules & Regulations Implementing the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 10 F.C.C.R. 12,391, ¶ 25 (1995).
There was some controversy over whether § 227(d)(2) should apply to
computer-based fax modems. The FCC ultimately concluded that a
computer-based fax modem qualifies as a TFM under the statute, and therefore must
mark identifying information on each document that it transmits. See 47
C.F.R. § 68.318(c)(3) (1996);
Rules & Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 10
F.C.C.R. 12,391, paras. 27-31 (1995); see also infra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
66. Most e-mail programs do, however, permit the user to enter arbitrary
text in one or more fields identifying the sender of a message. A telephone number or
other information could easily be included here, and (depending upon the software)
could be included in each subsequent outgoing message by default, just a fax machine
marks each outgoing fax with the sender's name and telephone number.
67. See Eckenwiler, supra note 11.
68. The preceding section,
47 U.S.C.
§ 226 (1994), concerns telephone operator services; the following section,
47 U.S.C.
§ 228 (1994), concerns 900 numbers and other pay-per-call
services.
69. See supra note 26 and
accompanying text.
70. In many instances it may be relatively foreseeable that the recipient
of an e-mail message will receive the message using a telephone connection. For
example, an e-mail address terminating in "@aol.com" represents an America Online
(AOL) subscriber. An AOL subscriber who has Internet access via a direct network
connection (perhaps at work or on a university campus) can access the system via the
Internet, but most AOL subscribers use modems to access the system, either directly or
through a dial-up Internet account. Therefore, one who sends e-mail to an AOL
subscriber can foresee that it will almost certainly be received over a telephone
line.
While e-mail is normally is not transmitted directly from the sender's computer
to the recipient's own telephone line, the statute does not require a direct
transmission; it merely requires that the advertisement be sent to a telephone
facsimile machine. See 47
U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). The
sender's knowledge of the recipient's means of receiving e-mail is probably relevant
only in determining whether the violation is willful, which affects the amount of
damages. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 227(b)(3). However, devices that blur the distinctions between these
technologies (such as e-mail-to-fax gateways) may render such distinctions
less meaningful.
71. See Hum in Electronic Mail Seen,
Christian Sci. Monitor, Jan. 19,
1982, at 11 (930 million e-mail messages were sent in 1980).
72. See William M. Bulkeley, Sifting the Junk Out of E-Mail,
Wall St. J., Feb. 28, 1991, at B1
("Electronic junk mail is becoming a nuisance for many personal-computer users
. . . .").
73. All of the definitions of TFM that appear in various versions of the
statute are stated in terms of the function of the device (sending or receiving
printed documents over telephone lines) rather than the method it uses. See
supra note 55.
74. See H.R. 2184, 101st Cong. (1989), reprinted in
Telemarketing Practices: Hearing on H.R. 628, H.R. 2131, and H.R. 2184 Before the
Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 101st Cong. 12-15 (1989).
75. See id.
76. See H.R. 1304, 102d Cong.,
H.R. Rep. 102-317, at 2-5 (1991); S.
1410, 102d Cong., 137 Cong. Rec.
S8992 (June 27, 1991) (companion bills). The bill included the following mandate:
(e) Consideration of
Facsimile Machine Restrictions.--Within 120 days after the
date of enactment of this section, the Commission shall initiate a
rulemaking proceeding to prescribe rules to restrict the use of any
telephone facsimile machine or computer or other electronic device to
send any unsolicited advertisement to the telephone facsimile machine of
any person. In establishing such restrictions, the Commission shall
consider--
(1) the extent to which unsolicited advertisements are transmitted
through telephone facsimile machines;
(2) the extent to which recipients of such advertisements incur
costs for such receipt; and
(3) the most cost effective methods of preventing advertising
abuses with telephone facsimile machines.
H.R. 1304, 102d Cong., H.R. Rep.
102-317, at 5.
77. See S. 1410, 102d Cong., 137
Cong. Rec. S16,200 (daily ed. Nov.
7, 1991).
78. See S. 1462, 102d Cong., 137
Cong. Rec. S9874 (daily ed. July 11,
1991).
79. See 137 Cong.
Rec. H11,307 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991).
80. See 137 Cong.
Rec. S18,782 (daily ed. Nov. 27, 1991).
81. See Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-243, § 2, 105 Stat. 2394, 2394-95 (1991).
82. See id. While seizure of telephone lines is
characterized as a threat to public safety, the findings appear to be referring to the
use of automated dialing systems rather than fax transmissions. See id.
§ 2(5).
83. 135 Cong. Rec. E1462
(daily ed. May 2, 1989) (statement of Rep. Markey).
Similar statements were made in support of the Telephone Advertising Consumer
Rights Act and the Automated Telephone Consumer Protection Act when they were
introduced two years later: "Unsolicited facsimile advertising ties up fax machines
and uses the called party's fax paper. This costs the recipient both time and money."
137 Cong. Rec. S8992 (daily ed. June
27, 1991) (statement of Sen. Pressler).
These unsolicited advertisements prevent the owners from using their own
fax machines for business purposes. Even worse, these transmissions
force the recipient to pay for the cost of the paper used to receive
them. These junk fax advertisements can be a severe impediment to
carrying out legitimate business practices and ought to be abolished.
137 Cong. Rec. S9874 (daily ed.
July 11, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings).
84. Jerry Knight, The Junk Fax Attack: Why Maryland May Outlaw
Unsolicited Advertisements, Wash.
Post, May 23, 1989, at C3, quoted in 136
Cong. Rec. H5820 (daily ed. July 30,
1990) (statement of Rep. Markey).
Markey also referred to the cost-shifting effect as the House considered
the final version of the TCPA:
When those junk faxes start coming over your machine, you do not think
like a Republican or a Democrat, you just think how are you going to be
able to get your hands around the neck of the person making you pay with
your paper for whatever message they are trying to send you.
137 Cong. Rec. H11,314 (daily ed.
Nov. 26, 1991) (statement of Rep. Markey).
85. Even in 1989, when all but the most expensive fax machines required
thermal paper, a one-page fax probably cost the average recipient less than 10
cents to print. See, e.g., A Bold Plan to End "Junk Fax,"
S.F. Chron., Jan. 20, 1989; Peter
Burrows, Bill Would Put Some Fax on Hold,
Newsday, June 29, 1989, at 43;
cf. Destination Ventures, Ltd., v. FCC, 46 F.3d 54 (9th Cir. 1995)
(contrasting plaintiff's estimate of 2 1/2 cents per page with FCC's
claim of 3 to 40 cents); Carroll Lachnit, Electronic "Junk Mail": Judge Orders Fax
Sender to Pay Businessman 22 Cents for Sending Unsolicited Ad,
Orange County Reg., July 3, 1991, at
B8 (describing small claims judgment of 22 cents for an unsolicited fax, apparently
one page long). As one commentator noted, the time required to take a one-minute
marketing call is worth much more than the cost of printing a one-page fax.
See Patrick Cox, Curbing "Junk Fax": The Market Will Deal with Fax
Attacks, USA Today, Feb. 8,
1989, at 8A.
86. See supra note 47 and
accompanying text; cf.
Telemarketing Practices: Hearing on H.R. 628, H.R. 2131, and H.R. 2184 Before the
Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 101st Cong. 21 (1989) (statement of Rep. Shays) ("Junk mail may be
annoying, but the sender at least pays the cost of the stamp and the paper it's
printed on.").
87. See 136 Cong.
Rec. H5820 (daily ed. July 30, 1990) (statement of Rep. Ritter);
H.R. Rep. 102-317, at 25 (1991).
88. The governors of both Connecticut and Maryland were inundated with
faxes critical of unsolicited fax legislation pending in those states, prompting both
governors to sign the legislation. See 136
Cong. Rec. H5820 (daily ed. July 30,
1990) (statement of Rep. Ritter). Cleveland Browns' fans launched a "fax attack" on
the Houston Oilers' office before a football game. See id. A less
dramatic but more relevant incident was described in a 1989 Wall Street Journal
article:
After a big incoming order was rendered illegible by a
10-page junk fax that jammed its machine, American Small
Business Computers Inc. in Pryor, Okla., tried to create a
computer program that would turn around and blacken an
entire roll of any junk advertiser's fax paper. But the
program didn't work.
Michele Manges, Junk Mail in the Age of Fax,
Wall St. J., May 3, 1989.
89. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 227(b)(2).
90. See 47 C.F.R.
§ 64.1200(f)(2) (1996).
91. See 47 C.F.R.
§ 68.318(c)(3) (1996); Rules & Regulations Implementing the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 10 F.C.C.R. 12,391, paras. 27-31 (1995).
92. "The question of whether the definition of telephone facsimile machine
includes fax boards is a matter of statutory interpretation that falls squarely within
the scope of this proceeding. The statute is ambiguous with respect to this question
and the legislative history provides no guidance."
Rules & Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991,
10 F.C.C.R. 12,391, ¶ 30.
93. Since the TCPA was enacted, Congress has enacted another statute which
imposes similar restrictions on telemarketers, though it does not repeat the ban on
unsolicited fax advertising. The
Telemarketing
and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 6101-08
(1994), is administered by the Federal
Trade Commission rather than the FCC. The FTC's Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16
C.F.R. § 310 (1996), implements
that statute. The FTC originally proposed to include e-mail and other online
marketing efforts in the scope of the rule, but relented following protests by online
industry groups. See Comments of the Interactive Services Association on
the Proposed FTC Telemarketing Rules, Mar. 31, 1995,
<http://www.isa.net/pubpol/ftctele.html>; Memorandum from Bill
Moroney and Sarah Reardon to the Government Affairs Committee, Electronic Messaging
Association, concerning the Proposed FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule, May 4, 1995,
<http://www.ema.org/html/at_work/ftctelem.htm>.
94. The Clipper chip proposal was an ill-fated attempt by the U.S.
government to provide people with a relatively secure means of encrypting
communications, but with a back door that could be used by authorized government
agencies. See generally A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor Is the Key: Cryptography, the
Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143
U. Penn. L. Rev. 709 (1995).
95. The Communications Decency Act (CDA) was part of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 502, 110 Stat. 56, 133-43. Most of the CDA
was struck down as unconstitutional in
ACLU v.
Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd,
117 S. Ct. 2329
(1997), and
Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd,
117 S. Ct. 2501 (1997).
96. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., No. 31063/94, 1995
N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995),
<http://www.jmls.edu/cyber/cases/stratton.txt> (holding that by
exercising editorial control, online service acted as publisher rather than
distributor for purposes of defamation action). The holding in Stratton
Oakmont has been widely criticized and was nullified by a provision in the
Communications Decency Act not challenged in the ACLU and Shea actions.
See 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(c) (West Supp. 1997).
97. See generally Gigante, supra note
28; David E. Sorkin, Revocation of an Internet Domain Name for Violations of
"Netiquette": Contractual and Constitutional Implications, 15
J. Marshall J. Computer & Info.
L. 587 (1997); Kim S. Nash, The Enforcers,
ComputerWorld, Apr. 15, 1996, at
103.
98. See, e.g., Scott Hazen Mueller, Serving Spam, Post No.
2, Dec. 17, 1996,
<http://www.hotwired.com/braintennis/96/51/index1a.html>.
99. See Kate Maddox, Online Marketers Look Past the Web,
Advert. Age, June 3, 1996, at 38
(noting enforcement difficulties presented by e-mail from Liechtenstein); cf.
Burk, supra note 28, at 1134 (arguing that state
regulation of Internet activities is constrained by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the dormant Commerce Clause).
100. Flight abroad is a more likely possibility for e-mai